Critical Legal Studies (CLS) provides a theoretical critique of the law in operation. To date, very few CLS analyses have focused upon criminal law. This phenomenon is particularly glaring given the prominence of criminal law in the American judicial system. This paper provides an overview of the CLS movement and a discussion of the value of deconstructing criminal law cases. Four legal formalisms are then used to critique the McCleskey v. Kemp' decision. A fifth formalism, the "sociology of race relations," is offered and applied to critique McCleskey.
I.
In existence for less than a score of years, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has engendered a great deal of debate and controversy. Reactions have been as diverse as calling for the academic ouster of its proponents, 2 heralding it as the heir to the school of legal realism, 3 and mandating its inclusion into the law school curriculum. 4 Much of
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the criticism against CLS has focused on the political leanings of its proponents. 5 But those who criticize it on that level cannot deny its scholarly value. 6 Specifically, CLS scholars set out to: [e]xpose the assumptions that underlie judicial and scholarly resolution of such issues, question the presuppositions about law and society of those whose intellectual product is being analyzed and examine the subtle effects these products have in shaping legal and social consequences. 7 Like the legal realism movement, the CLS movement provides a paradigm for analyzing the law." The value of the CLS approach lies in its non-static interpretation and analysis of the law.
Given the apparent charge and worth of a critical legal critique, it is surprising that critical legal scholars have focused so little of their attention upon criminal law. 9 This paper seeks to take one step toward filling this void. 10 This paper is divided into six sections. The next section examines the role of criminal law in the critical legal studies movement. In particular, this section analyzes why so little attention has been given to criminal law. The third section outlines the methodology employed by Professors Mark Tushnet andJenniferJaff for "deconstructing" the legal reasoning used in criminal cases. The 5 Id. at 530-31. See Friedrichs, supra note 3, at 18-19. Much of the criticism about the critical legal studies movement suggests that it is comprised of a fringe, outside group. In fact, the critical legal studies critique of the law and its pedagogy results in what could be termed a critical view from the inside, The training and profession of critical legal scholars make them a part of the system rather than external to it. Id. at 16;John H. Schlegel 588-89 (1984) .
8 Theories reflecting Weberian, Marxist, and pluralistic analyses have all been applied by critical legal studies scholars. Central to the critical legal studies search for theory has been the work of the Frankfurt school and Gramsci. See, e.g., ANTONIO GRAMsci, PRrsoN NoTFBooKs (1991) ; JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISES (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) . The diversity in theoretical perspectives has led at least one sociologist to state that the critical legal studies movement is "currently in search of (a] theory." DRAC AN MILOVA fourth section uses this methodology--an application of legal formalisms-to critique the McCleskey v. Kemp decision. The fifth section considers the ability of these formalisms to deconstruct McCleskey. Finding them inadequate, this paper offers a fifth legal formalism. This formalism, the "sociology of race relations," considers the impact of race relations upon judicial decision making. The conclusion discusses the value of using CLS principles to examine criminal law.
II. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND A CRITIQUE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
Scholars have applied the CLS methodology 1 ' to several substantive areas of law, including labor law, 12 anti-discrimination law, 13 contract law, 14 and the role of women and the law. 15 The relative omission of criminal law from the critical legal scholars' scrutiny is particularly glaring given the seminal role criminal law plays in the American legal system.' 6 Professor David Nelken observes:
It is the branch of law where most social studies have been done of the 'law in action' and where the gulf between ideals of equality and the reality of differentiation has been shown to be glaring and recurrent, and where official arbitrariness and repression are most obvious.
17
Within the fifteen-year history of the CLS movement,' 8 fewer than fif-I I While critical legal studies proponents do not have a uniform perspective or ideological commitment, the school has some unifying principles. Trubek identifies four such principles: (1) indeterminacy, or the belief that legal doctrine is not systematic and does not offer a definitive answer for all circumstances; (2) anti-formalism, in that critical legal scholars argue that there is neither a value-free, nor an autonomous legal methodology; (3) contradiction, in that critical legal scholars argue that legal doctrine does not provide a single, coherent view of human relations, but describes competing relationships; and (4) marginality, in the view that the law is not necessarily a significant variable controlling social behavior. Trubek, supra note 7, at 577-79. For a detailed discussion of critical legal studies doctrines, see ROBERTO 27 This issue has also been raised in analyses of the development of critical criminology.
"Criminal law is not worth discussing.., because it is too essential a feature of the social order, including any realistic alternative order."
28
Nelken rejects this argument as well. Accepting the conclusion that criminal law is necessary-and as such, that there is no alternative to it-does not require accepting the premise that criminal law is above criticism. In fact, the opposite is true. It is precisely the importance of criminal law to the social order which necessitates its close scrutiny. While few CLS articles critique criminal law, even fewer deconstruct criminal law cases. 2 9 The few CLS writings in this area have critiqued abstract criminal law doctrine rather than case law analysisthe heart of law school pedagogy. As Professor Mark Kelman observes, it is as important to know that "interpretive constructs" pervade substantive criminal law, 3 0 as it is to know how these constructs are applied in legal discourse analysis. 3 Given the relationship between crime and the social order as evidenced by the salience of crime in the American mind 35 and the influence the courts have in shaping public opinion, wide scale case law deconstruction is worthwhile.
III. CASE LAw CRITIQUE OF LEGAL FoRMALIsM
Tushnet and Jaff offer one of the few CLS treatments of criminal law. 3 4 They critique legal formalism which they define as, "the position which claims that results in any particular case are in some nontrivial sense determined by a set of general principles." 35 28 Nelken, supra note 16, at 107. 29 As observed by Friedrichs, the existence of a radical criminology does not fill the void for an "autonomous tradition of radicalism" in criminal justice. Friedrichs, supra note 3.
30 Kelman, supra note 19, at 592. 
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ples of law are drawn from controlling legal documents; (2) moral philosophy legal principles are determined by fundamental principles of morality; (3) law and economics-legal principles are drawn from what are believed to be the logical consequences of assumptions about human rationality and strategic behavior in situations with limited resources, and (4) sociology of Professions. principles are based upon the systematic observation of the actions of participants in the legal system. 3 6 Accordingly, principles are adopted which make the criminal justice process easiest for 'repeat players'-those participants most frequently involved in the criminal justice system. 3 7 These four legal formalisms are an outgrowth of "rule-skepticism."
38
Tushnet and Jaff use Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 39 a plea bargaining case, to examine how these formalisms are applied in a criminal case. 4° They find that with each type of formalism, the Court's decision was neither logical nor predetermined. In Bordenkircher, the defendant was indicted for passing a bad check worth $88.30. 41 The defendant had two prior felony convictions, and if convicted of passing a bad check, he would have faced a mandatory life sentence under the Kentucky habitual offender statute. 42 With the stated goal ofjudicial efficiency, the prosecutor offered to recommend a five year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. 43 The defendant refused the plea bargain and pleaded not guilty. He was subsequently indicted and convicted at trial. 44 On appeal, he argued that the plea bargaining offer constituted a threat in violation of his constitutional right to due process. 45 The United States Supreme Court upheld plea bargaining as an "important component" 46 of the criminal justice system which does not violate due process. 47 36 Id. at 361-62. 37 Tushnet and Jaff clearly note that "repeat players" is narrowly defined. The term refers to courtroom personnel, includingjudges, defense attorneys, and prosecuting attorneys. d. at 375. As such, the term does not include a "iepeatC defendant in the criminal justice system. 38 According to Tushnet andJaf, rule-skepticism posits that "in a reasonably well developed system of legal rules, talented lawyers could produce arguments, resting on accepted premises of the system, that supported both a result and its opposite, and that those arguments would satisfy any demands that might be made for internal coherence or consistency with prior decisions." Id. at 361. 
1994]
In their discussion of classical doctrinal formalism, Tushnet and Jaff note that both individual and systemic level analyses are available. 48 On both levels they find that the Court's decision was not mandated. First, the Court could have found that the plea bargain constituted a unilateral-thus unfair-offer, rather than a bilateral offer. 49 The Court, however, found that plea bargaining reflects a "mutuality of advantage," suggesting that the parties (prosecution and defense) are in equal bargaining positions.
50 Tushnet andJaff's analysis proves that there is no such obvious mutuality.
5 1 Second, Tushnet andJaff reject the Court's suggestion that its decision was necessary to make plea bargaining work. 52 Had the Court decided in favor of the defendant, plea bargaining would still be available to prosecutors, with some limits. The prosecutor could have "overcharged" him, thereby forcing the prosecution to bargain downward.
5
The second legal fonnalism Tushnet and Jaff examine is moral philosophy.
54 Among the points they discuss is the role of "free will." 5 5 Tushnet andJaff find that the Court offers free will as a rationale for its decision-i.e., that the defendant could accept or reject the plea offer.
56 However, they maintain that free will does not operate in a plea bargaining system. 5 7 Their discussion of moral philosophy overlaps with their discussion of doctrinal formalism. Tushnett and Jaff conclude that defendants who are offered a plea bargain are not being offered an equally acceptable alternative or choice, since they will expose themselves to a potentially longer sentence if they are convicted.
8
Tushnet andJaff also note the fallibility of the Court's retribution rationale. 59 They argue that the retribution argument is unpersuasive since habitual offender statutes violate the principles of retribution philosophy. An offender who presumably has committed and already 48 Id. at 364. [Vol. 85 received punishment for prior offenses is being punished twice. 60 Third, Tushnet andjaff examine law and economics formalism as applied in Bordenkircher. 6 1 The law and economics approach is one of the leading recent innovations in formalism. 62 Utilizing the analysis of Judge Frank Easterbrook, Tushnet and Jaff examine whether plea bargaining is a "well functioning market." 6 3 They discover that the Court does not prove that its decision to leave the prosecutor unregulated is socially optimal. 6 4 Tushnet and Jaff observe that while a plea deal may be entered into, it may be based upon false or misleading information. 6 5 They also point out that plea bargaining is not always available to the prosecution. 6 6 For example, in cases involving politically unpopular figures or sensational murders, society may force a trial when the prosecutor would otherwise make a plea offer. Tushnet andJaff's discussion of law and economics raises the question of the overall cost-benefit of plea bargaining and the selectiveness with which it is applied.
The last formalism Tushnet and Jaff discuss is the "sociology of professions." 6 8 As noted, this type of legal formalism maintains that the criminal process "is designed to meet the concerns of the participants in a system that the participants conceive of as a system of jobs." 69 Accordingly, an examination of the system should show that the established rules make life easiest for regular participants in the system. 7 0 Tushnet and Jaff conclude, however, that plea bargaining, as used in Bordenkircher, does not necessarily make the job easier for the participating judge and lawyers. This is true because defendants like the one in Bordenkircher leave the system believing they were treated unfairly. Such an outcome does not benefit any of the system's legal actors. 71 Id. at 375. One of the obvious threads running through the discussion of these formalisms is the inequity between the bargaining parties.
Court's decision in McClskey, and concludes that none of them is adequate to explain the result. The McCleskey case was selected for three reasons. First, it has had an impact upon the use and applicability of social science research in criminal cases in general, and capital cases in particular. 7 2 Second, the decision provides legal ammunition for both death penalty proponents and opponents: Proponents of capital punishment offer McCleskey as "proof" that the death penalty is not discriminatorily applied; abolitionists suggest that the rationale offered by the Court is legal "mumbo jumbo" designed to maintain the status quo. Third, McCleskey involves society's ultimate criminal sanction. The history of the death penalty, which includes its use as a method of "disciplining" racial minorities, 73 as well as its joining of law, criminology, and politics, makes it ripe for CLS application. At the penalty hearing, upon consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Georgia jury recommended the death penalty.7 5 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 76 After a series of unsuccessful state court appeals, McCleskey sought federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory manner. 77 Specifically, he argued that the Georgia statute operated in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections against arbitrariness and discrimination in capital sentencing. 78 To support his constitutional claims, McCleskey offered the results of an empirical study of the Georgia capital sentencing system by Professor David Baldus. 79 The study provides a multiple regression analysis of over 2000 cases prosecuted in Georgia during the 1970s. Professor Baldus controlled for over 230 variables in addition to race, which could have explained the reported disparities on nonracial grounds. The study reported findings in three major areas. First, the race of the victim was a significant predictor for whether a defendant would receive a death sentence. 8 1 Defendants charged with killing White persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, while those defendants charged with killing Blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases. 8 2 Further, the raw numbers indicated that 4% of the Black and 7% of the White defendants received a death sentence. 8 3 Second, the racial combination of race of the victim and race of the defendant was found to be an important factor in determining who would be sentenced to death. 8 4 The Baldus study showed that courts were most likely to impose the death penalty where the defendant was Black and the victim was White (22%) and least likely where the defendant and victim were both Black (1%). Where both the victim and the defendant were White, courts imposed a death sentence in 8% of the cases. In those cases with a Black victim and a White defendant, courts imposed the death penalty in 3% of the cases. Third, the Baldus study examined the impact of prosecutorial discretion by race of the victim and defendant. The study found that prosecutors requested the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving Black defendants and White victims; 32% of the cases which involved White defendants and White victims; 15% of the cases with Black defendants and Black victims, and 19% of the cases involving White defendants and Black victims. The Court accepted the validity of the evidence but found, in a 5-4 decision, 6 that the Baldus study was "clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decision makers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose." 8 7 Further, the Court stated that "at most the study indicated a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race." 8 An examination of the doctrinal formalism operating in McCleskey establishes that the Supreme Court could just as easily have found that the Baldus study proved that the Georgia capital sentencing scheme operated in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. An analysis of two aspects of the Court's reasoning shows that it could have used its formalistic arguments to reach a contrary result.
First, the Court found the Baldus statistics distinguishable from those presented in venire selection and Title VII (employment discrimination) cases. The Court noted that although it has accepted statistical disparities as proof of an Equal Protection Clause violation in cases where the statistics did not present a stark pattern of racial disparity, the McCleskey facts did not compel such a result. 9 1 Further, the Court stated: "[T]he nature of the capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of the statistics to that decision, are fundamentally different from the corresponding elements in the venire-selection or Title VII cases." 92 Specifically, the Court found that drawing an inference from general statistics to a specific venire selection (or Title VII employment discrimination) case cannot be compared with an inference drawn from general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing. 93 According to the Court, these stages are not comparable, since in the former fewer variables are relevant to the challenged decisions and the statistics relate to fewer entities. 94 Further, "in venire-selection and Title VII contexts, the decision maker has an opportunity to explain the statistical disparity." [Vol. 85 findings were stronger than those offered in the venire-selection and Title VII cases. It could also have found that because the inequity established by the empirical data could result in death, as opposed to a denial of participation in a jury pool or discrimination in employment, they were sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Further, the Court might have made a distinction between the types of cases on civil versus criminal grounds. Alternately, the Court could have found that a death penalty petitioner seeking to establish a "stark" pattern of discrimination has a lighter burden than is required in other equal protection clause contexts. Also, the Court could have found that because of the nature of the penalty involved, McCleskey had a burden no greater than that of a venire-selection or Title VII claimant. 96 The Court observed that unlike the jury selection cases, the state in McCleskey did not and would not have a chance to rebut the Baldus findings. 9 7 While noting this distinction, the Court could have resolved that the statistics speak for themselves-that disparity which is unexplained may, in select instances, be sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.
Second, the Court found that because discretion is an integral part of the criminal justice process, "exceptionally clear proof" of abuse is required before an inference can be drawn that there has been an abuse of discretion. 98 The Court set out the following premises and conclusion: (1) discretion is necessary for the smooth operation of the criminal justice system; (2) abuse of discretion can only be established by exceptionally clear proof; (3) death penalty cases are unique; and, therefore (4) the Baldus statistics do not allow for an abuse of discretion inference to be drawn.
This line of reasoning is circular and self-legitimating. The Court makes clear that while discretion is necessary and abuses may be established, no abuse of discretion is manifest by the McCleskey facts. But the Court could just as well have said that discretion is necessary, abuses may be established, and they are proven by the case facts. The Court does not explain why the Baldus statistics are insufficient. Would statistics showing that a Black defendant whose victim was White had a 37% probability of being sentenced to death constitute exceptionally clear proof, or does the Court say that Baldus-type statistics are never sufficient to prove an inference of discriminatory pur- 97 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296. 98 Id. at 297.
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pose? The Court questions the point at which the risk of racial prejudice in capital sentencing becomes "constitutionally unacceptable," 99 but it never indicates where this point is or whether such a point even exists.' 0 0 For these reasons, it is not clear that the Court's decision was either logical or required by the facts.
B. MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Beyond classical doctrinal formalism, the Court in McCleskey invoked moral philosophy to justify its decision. In its discussion of fairness, the Court attempted to show that it had to reject McCleskey's arguments. The Court stated that imposition of the death penalty is fair since it is proportionately imposed and allows the sentencer to consider all relevant information.' 1 0
The Court noted that public opinion affects whether or not a particular punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 0 2 Further, interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is guided by "evolving standards of decency." 1 0 3 The Court also noted that the post-Furman v. Georgia 0 4 legislative response reflects society's long history of accepting the death penalty for murder. 0 5 The majority surmises that imposition of the death penalty for murder is justifiable since it reflects a moral consensus and has social utility. 16 The second prong of the Court's moral philosophy argumentthat the decision is fair because the Georgia scheme meets constitutional guidelines-is circuitous. Specifically, the Georgia death penalty law has three features: (1) it requires the sentencer to consider the circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender; (2) it allows for consideration of mitigating facts which allows the sentencer to decline to impose the death penalty; and (3) it allows the death penalty only for certain cases. While the Court argued that its decision was fair, it also made clear that "fair" is a relative concept.
The claim that the decision is fair can be challenged on at least two grounds. First, because the moral climate partly determines the 99 Id. at 308-09 (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.8 (1986)).
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constitutionality of the death penalty, 10 7 it is possible that five years from now the Court could decide a case involving comparable facts to McCleskey differently. This observation is an important one. The Court in Trop v. Dulles stated that the acceptability of the death penalty reflects society's evolving morality, 08 but the death penalty cannot be discriminatorily or arbitrarily applied. 10 9 The Baldus findings raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the death penalty meets these standards. Second, the Court's decision is questionable because the death penalty is not a morally required punishment for those who kill-it is not absolutely required." 0 Specifically, the retributivist philosophy of punishment, adopted by some death penalty proponents, does not require taking the life of a person who has taken another's life. 1 ' Thus, a critique of the moral philosophy in McCleskey shows that the Court's holding was not necessary to produce a fair result.
C. LAW AND ECONOMICS
The third type of formalism discussed by Tushnet and Jaff is law and economics. The Court in McCleskey relies upon law and economics formalism for part of its decision. Law and economics formalism seeks to explain results in terms of the allocation of scarce resources. The Court found that McCleskey's claim, at its core, questioned "the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system." When constitutional protections are at issue-especially those involving life or death-questions regarding the economic efficiency of the court system should not be controlling. More to the point, applying a law and economics analysis to the McCleskey facts shows that a decision for McCleskey would at least have been as efficient as a decision against him. In fact, the Court's concern that a decision in favor of McCleskey would burden the already full court dockets is misplaced.
First, if the Court had found for McCleskey, it could have decided to limit its holding to capital cases since these involve the most serious criminal penalties. 1 5 Second, even assuming that a decision for McCleskey would initially result in an increased number of cases, ultimately the volume of claims would fall off. Each state faced with the threat of McCleskey-like challenges would likely commission studies to determine whether the death penalty was being discriminatorily applied. If these studies showed disparities like those found by the Baldus study, the state would take corrective measures.' 1 6 Third, the Court's concern with overcrowded courts appears somewhat disingenuous, given its directive to McCleskey to present his claims to a legislative body.' 1 7 If the majority in McCleskey was truly concerned with decreasing (or at least not increasing) court dockets, it would not have suggested that McCleskey petition a legislative body. A successful petition would create a new basis for a constitutional challenge and increase litigation.
D. SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONS
Of the four versions of legal formalism discussed by Tushnet and Jaff, the Court in McCleskey relied least upon the sociology of professions tojustify its decision. The Court did, however, make clear that a contrary decision would adversely impact the role of the prosecutor. 118 The Court rejected the argument that discretion in the criminal justice system should be curtailed: "McCleskey's argument that 115 See Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Ciminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1611 (1988) . "The Court's fear of opening the floodgates is unfounded .... Beyond the severity of the death sanction, [r] ace is a unique characteristic. The Court has continually expressed its commitment to abolish distinctions based on ancestry or race. In particular, the consideration of race in capital sentencing is constitutionally impermissible." Id. (citations omitted).
116 One possible corrective measure, though far from ideal, would be for states to more closely monitor, and in some instances encourage, the use of reduced jury overrides. These overrides would allow a capital judge to impose a sentence of life without parole where the jury has advised a death sentence.
117 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319. The four legal formalisms Tushnet and Jaff applied to Bordenkircher begin to fill the void of CLS criminal law case analysis. While these formalisms offer divergent perspectives from which case law can be deconstructed, they do not provide a complete paradigm for analysis. In fact, Tushnet and Jaff did not intend their formalistic analyses to be exhaustive.' 2 0 Notably, a discussion of race does not fit neatly into any of the four formalisms. Mainstream critical legal scholars have been legitimately criticized for failing to incorporate race into their critiques.' 2 ' In fact, this foundational absence has spawned a CLS splinter group-critical race theorists. Professor Crenshaw argues for the necessity of including race in a CLS analysis:
[R]acism is a central ideological underpinning of American society. Critical scholars who focus on legal consciousness alone thus fail to address one of the most crucial ideological components of the dominant order. The CLS practice of delegitimating false and constraining ideas must include race consciousness if the accepted object is to transcend oppressive belief systems.'
22
Given the interracial nature of the McCleskey case and the Baldus findings, an analysis of the role of race and legal decision making is worth a separate critique. The "sociology of race relations" is offered here to describe a formalism which encompasses the belief that cases are decided in a race neutral manner, in compliance with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. This formalism follows logically from determinismthe belief that legal doctrine is systematic, definitive, and operates However, the criminal justice system, inexplicable in isolation, is realistically examined in its socio-political-historical context. With regard to race, the historically inequitable treatment of minorities in general 124 and Blacks in particular, by the criminal justice system is well documented.1 25 This disparate treatment rings particularly true for Blacks and the application of the death penalty. 126 This history calls into question the sociology of race relations formalism. Specifically, it challenges the notion that capital cases can be examined on a case-bycase basis, without regard to historical facts. An examination of McCleskey suggests that the Court's decision is not race-neutral. The Court clearly outlined its record of hearing racial discrimination challenges, 27 but remained unpersuaded by McCleskey's arguments. As noted, beyond the Baldus study, the Court was faced with the history of southern race relations and it was legally cognizant of the conditions which led to the Baldus findings-the turbulent history of racial conflict between Blacks and Whites, and the criminal justice system-for the south in general and for Georgia in particular. 128 Professor Sherri Johnson's analysis of McCleskey offers a framework for critiquing the sociology of race relations formalism. 129 Johnson argues that issues of race permeate the majority's decision. Specifically, Johnson asserts that the Court's proffered rationale for denying relief reveals a blind spot in its equal protection analyses. 130 Johnson labels this blindspot "unconscious racism."' 3 1 She concludes that the "cognizance of the frequency with which racial stereotypes alter judgement should influence how 'stark' a statistical disparity must be to raise a presumption of a race-based decision, particularly where, as here [ 
